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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is tasked with 
two conflicting missions: it must protect investors and simultaneously 
maintain the integrity and efficiency of capital markets.1 The SEC 
protects investors by imposing a disclosure regime that reduces 
information asymmetries between the public and corporate insiders.2 
Enhanced disclosure obligations, however, impose significant costs on 
corporations.3 Balancing these two objectives is a delicate task, but 
one that should be reflected in any judicial construction of securities 
law. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds4 will require the 
Supreme Court to apply this trade-off in the context of Section 16 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that 
any director, officer, or beneficial owner of more than ten percent of 
any class of equity securities must disclose his ownership of such 
securities within ten days of becoming a beneficial owner of such 
security or within two days of any change in such ownership.5 Section 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, 
and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 
20, 2012). 
 2.  See id. (stating that investments are best protected by requiring disclosure of 
information to the public). 
 3.  See infra Part V. 
 4.  Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, No. 10-1261 (U.S. argued Nov. 29, 
2011). 
 5.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(a) (West 2010). 
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16(b) requires that all profits generated by the insider from the 
purchase or sale of such securities within a period of less than six 
months be disgorged back to the issuer.6 Moreover, the Section reads: 
“[N]o such suit [under Section 16(b)] shall be brought more than two 
years after the date such profit was realized.”7 Section 16(b) relies 
exclusively on a private right of action by stockholders of the issuing 
corporation.8 The SEC has carved out an underwriter exemption to 
both disclosure under 16(a) and disgorgement under 16(b), allowing 
underwriters to keep their profits from short-swing transactions when 
acting in good faith and in the ordinary course of business.9 
In Credit Suisse Securities, the Supreme Court will address the 
applicability of equitable tolling doctrines to Section 16(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Specifically, the Court must decide 
between four distinct approaches: disclosure, actual notice, discovery, 
and repose.10 Because each choice represents a significant change in 
the balance of responsibilities between shareholders and insiders of a 
corporation, the Court will have to look outside the factual 
boundaries of the case to properly assess the policy implications of 
each proposed alternative.11 
II. FACTS OF THE CASE 
The 1990s saw a tremendous boom in the technology sector, 
generating massive speculation and tremendous opportunities for 
raising capital in the primary markets.12 Technology companies took 
advantage of this environment by issuing hundreds of initial public 
offerings (IPOs).13 In an IPO, the investment banks that form the 
underwriting syndicate determine the price of an IPO’s shares as well 
as the number of shares to be issued. The banks then commit to 
underwriting the transaction: purchasing the entire equity issuance at 
a below-market price and subsequently distributing the securities to 
 
 6.  § 16(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(b) (West 2010)). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  See id. (“Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of 
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name 
and in behalf of the issuer . . . .”). 
 9.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-7(a) (West 2011) (creating an underwriter exemption to 
Section 16(a)); see also § 240.16a(10) (applying the underwriter exemption to Section 16(b)). 
 10.  See infra Part III. 
 11.  See infra Part V. 
 12.  See Brief for Respondent at 6–7, Credit Suisse Sec. v. Simmonds, No. 10-1261 (U.S. 
Sept. 26, 2011) (discussing “hot” IPOs of the dot-com era). 
 13.  Id. at 7. 
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the public at a higher fixed price.14 Critically, the issuer transfers the 
offered shares onto the underwriters’ books, giving the underwriters 
large, though temporary, stakes in the issuers’ corporations.15 
Because underwriters’ profits are determined by the spread 
between the initial and fixed prices, they take on the risk of low 
demand. In the volatile markets of the 1990s, share prices of 
technology IPOs would often increase exponentially in the weeks 
following the public offerings; investors who managed to get their 
hands on hot IPO shares often made tremendous returns.16 
In March of 2000, the dot-com bubble burst and hundreds of 
technology stocks tanked. This prompted thousands of investors to 
file a class action lawsuit in connection with more than 300 IPOs.17 
Shareholders challenged Underwriters’18 conduct under antitrust laws, 
basing their suit on two distinct factual claims.19 First, the shareholders 
alleged that the Underwriters would initiate frenzies by entering into 
“laddering” arrangements—wherein investors were required to buy 
IPO shares at increasingly higher prices in the aftermarket in order to 
secure allocations of the IPOs.20 Second, shareholders alleged that the 
Underwriters would receive kickbacks from investors who were 
allocated shares in the early stages of an offering through “tying” 
arrangements, or agreements to purchase different securities at later 
dates.21 The Supreme Court dismissed these antitrust complaints, 
holding that an extension of antitrust law to the facts of the IPO 
litigation would infringe on the realm of securities regulation.22 
Six years later, in 2006, Respondent Vanessa Simmonds bought 
shares in fifty-five of the companies subject to the earlier IPO 
litigation.23 Simmonds, now a shareholder of the companies that 
 
 14.  See id. (explaining how underwriters buy cheap and sell high shortly after purchase). 
 15.  See id. at 10 (stating that, collectively, the underwriters were beneficial owners of more 
than ten percent of issuer securities). 
 16.  Id. at 7. 
 17.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 3, Credit 
Suisse Sec., No. 10-1261 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2011). 
 18.  The defendants in this litigation include Credit Suisse Securities (USA) and dozens of 
other underwriters. 
 19.  Credit Suisse Sec. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 267 (2007). 
 20.  See id. at 269–70 (noting that plaintiffs in suit were suing over “laddering” 
arrangements). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See id. at 285 (“We therefore conclude that the securities laws are ‘clearly 
incompatible’ with the application of the antitrust laws in this context.”). 
 23.  Brief for Petitioner at 10, Credit Suisse Sec., No. 10-1261 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2011). 
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conducted IPOs in 1999 and 2000, brought derivative suits under a 
modified legal challenge based on nearly identical factual claims.24 She 
alleged that the Underwriters of the IPOs were beneficial owners of 
more than ten percent of company securities and profited from the 
short-swing trading of such securities in violation of Section 16(b).25 
Moreover, Simmonds asserted that the Underwriters’ alleged tying 
and laddering arrangements were not done in good faith and 
therefore were not subject to the underwriter exemption.26 Finally, 
because the Underwriters failed to report these non-exempt short-
swing transactions with a Section 16(a) disclosure, Simmonds claimed 
that Section 16(b)’s two-year statute of limitations should be subject 
to equitable tolling.27 This final claim is at issue before the Supreme 
Court. 
After Simmonds settled one case out of court, the Underwriters 
moved to dismiss the remaining fifty-four complaints on the ground 
that the claims were time-barred, having been filed more than two 
years after the date the profits at issue were realized.28 The district 
court agreed with regard to twenty-four of the claims.29 According to 
the district court, the two-year statute of limitations in Section 16(b) 
was not tolled because Simmonds had access to all of the information 
necessary to bring a claim under Section 16(b) more than two years 
before filing suit.30 Therefore, the equitable tolling doctrine was 
inapplicable.31 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Section 16(b)’s 
statute of limitations is tolled until the Underwriters disclose their 
transactions via a filing of Section 16(a) disclosure statements.32 To 
date, no such statements have been filed.33 
 
 24.  See Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec., 638 F.3d 1072, 1085 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
131 S. Ct. 3064 (U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1261) (alleging the same factual accusations of 
laddering, tying, and kickbacks as were alleged against underwriters in Billing). 
 25.  Id. at 1084. 
 26.  Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 56, Simmonds, 638 F.3d 1072 (No. C07-1649). 
 27.  Id. at 21–23. 
 28.  Underwriter Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants’ Reply at 1, Simmonds, 638 F.3d 
1072 (No. C07-1649). 
 29.  In re Section 16(b) Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (dismissing 
the thirty remaining cases for insufficient demand). 
 30.  Id. at 1217. 
 31.  Id. at 1218. 
 32.  Simmonds, 638 F.3d at 1096–97. 
 33.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 10–11. 
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III. BACKGROUND LAW 
Credit Suisse Securities requires the Supreme Court to determine 
if equitable tolling applies to Section 16(b)’s limitations period. If the 
Court holds that Section 16(b) contains a statute of limitations subject 
to equitable tolling, it will then have to determine the scope of the 
equitable tolling doctrine in the context of Section 16(b) litigation.34 
Equitable tolling, a legal doctrine enumerated in Holmberg v. 
Armbrecht,35 delays the running of the statute of limitations whenever 
defendants have defrauded or concealed facts essential to a plaintiff’s 
cause of action.36 The Supreme Court has recognized a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of equitable tolling where a defendant defrauds 
or misrepresents material facts, preventing a plaintiff from filing suit 
within the statutory time limit.37 This rule derives from the maxim that 
a party should not be allowed to profit from its own misconduct.38 In 
addition, tolling is appropriate not only in cases of affirmative 
misrepresentation, but also where a party’s silence breaches an 
independent legal duty to disclose.39 
Section 16(b) is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.40 On the 
one hand, it “imposes strict liability regardless of motive, including 
trades not actually based on inside information.”41 On the other hand, 
there is no liability for actual insider trading done over a period 
longer than six months.42 This structure was not accidental nor a 
consequence of poor drafting. Rather, it was a purposive attempt by 
Congress to meet the Securities Exchange Act’s stated goal of “easy 
 
 34.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at i (framing the questions presented as 
“[w]hether the two-year time limit . . . is subject to tolling, and, if so, whether tolling continues 
even after the receipt of notice of facts giving rise to the action”). 
 35.  327 U.S. 392 (1946). 
 36.  Id. at 397. 
 37.  Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). 
 38.  See, e.g., Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232–33 (1959) (“[W]e need 
look no further than the maxim that no man may take advantage of his own wrong. Deeply 
rooted in our jurisprudence this principle has been applied in many diverse classes of cases by 
both law and equity courts and has frequently been employed to bar inequitable reliance on 
statutes of limitations.” (footnote omitted)). 
 39.  See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (stating that “silence in 
connection with purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud” with “such liability . . . 
premised upon a duty to disclose”); see also Sprint Commc’ns v. FCC, 76 F.3d 1221, 1226 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996) (“Silence does toll the statute of limitations, however, if the defendant has an 
affirmative duty to disclose . . . .”). 
 40.  Dreiling v. Am. Exp. Co., 458 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
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administration.”43 By providing strict bright-line rules, Congress 
sought to diminish problems of proof and reduce uncertainty in 
Section 16(b)’s application.44 As a result, courts have been hesitant to 
“exceed a literal, ‘mechanical’ application of the statutory text.”45 
The Section’s statute of limitations reads in relevant part: “Suit to 
recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity . . . but no 
such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such 
profit was realized.”46 The statute contains no reference to a plaintiff’s 
discovery of facts.47 However, given that courts are hesitant to exceed 
literal interpretations of Section 16(b)’s operative provisions, it seems 
plausible that they would apply such restrictive reasoning to the 
language of the timing provision as well. Nonetheless, this plain 
meaning interpretation of the provision has not prevented courts 
from applying equitable tolling. 
The Circuits are split between three equity-based approaches to 
tolling of Section 16(b) claims. In Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp.,48 the 
Ninth Circuit adopted a disclosure approach to equitable tolling.49 The 
plaintiff argued that Section 16(b)’s statute of limitations should be 
tolled until a defendant files a Section 16(a) report.50 The court 
agreed, holding that the two-year time limit did not begin to run 
because the insider never disclosed the covered transaction with a 
16(a) report.51 The court reasoned that Congress’s goal of limiting 
insider trading would be circumscribed if an insider could simply 
avoid the effects of Section 16(b) by failing to disclose the covered 
transactions as required by Section 16(a).52 
 
 
 43.  Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 122 (1991) (quoting Reliance Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 
425); see also Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 251 (1976) (refusing 
to interpret Section 16(b) beyond its “narrowly drawn limits”); see also Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593–96 (1973) (suggesting that courts should not 
interpret Section 16(b) beyond its “strict terms”). 
 46.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(b) (West 2010). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 49.  See id. at 528–29. 
 50.  Id. at 527. 
 51.  Id. at 529. 
 52.  See id. at 528 (“If insiders could insulate their transactions from the scrutiny of outside 
shareholders by failing to files 16(a) reports and waiting for the two year time limit to pass, then 
Congress’s creation of these shareholders’ derivative suits would be nullified.”). 
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Using a different approach, the Second Circuit nevertheless came 
to a similar conclusion in Litzler v. CC Investments, L.D.C.53 The court 
began its analysis by distinguishing inquiry notice from actual notice.54 
Under inquiry notice, a statute of limitations will be tolled until a 
reasonably diligent plaintiff has sufficient information to inquire into 
the potential violation.55 A plaintiff’s knowledge of his injury, 
therefore, would defeat equitable tolling. The Litzler court found, 
however, that Section 16 imposes an “absolute duty” of disclosure that 
would be strained if inquiry notice applied.56 Shareholders are not 
supposed to piece together the relevant facts needed to bring a claim 
under Section 16(b). Instead, shareholders have a justified 
expectation that any information pertinent to a Section 16(b) 
violation would be publicly available through a Section 16(a) 
disclosure.57 Therefore, the statute should be tolled until the 
shareholder or company gets “actual notice that a person subject to 
Section 16(a) has realized specific short-swing profits that are worth 
pursuing.”58 Actual notice, according to the court, can only be 
triggered by compliance with Section 16(a).59 
The third equity-based approachthe discovery approachwas 
enumerated in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds.60 According to the Merck 
Court, if a defendant has misrepresented or wrongfully concealed 
facts essential to the plaintiff’s case, the statute of limitations will be 
tolled until a reasonably diligent plaintiff discovers or should discover 
the facts that would form the basis of a claim.61 Although the filing of 
a disclosure form would presumably give shareholders sufficient 
information to discover Section 16(b) violations, a shareholder also 
can be alerted to possible violations through alternative means, such 
as pleadings filed in a previous case. Therefore, a discovery approach 
dictates that Section 16(b)’s statute of limitations begins to run as 
 
 53.  362 F.3d 203 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 54.  Id. at 207–08. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 208 (quoting Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)). 
 57.  See id. (“Section 16 compels disclosure (through a Form 4) that is so clear that an 
insider’s short-swing profits will be discovered without any investigation other than the putting 
together of two and two.”). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See id. (“Such tolling should continue only until the claimant or (depending on the 
circumstances) the company gets actual notice that a person subject to Section 16(a) has 
realized specific short-swing profits that are worth pursuing.”). 
 60.  See Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1796 (2010) (holding that a discovery 
approach applies to section 10(b)). 
 61.  Id. at 1789–90. 
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soon as shareholders should discover information that could form the 
basis of a short-swing claim, whether or not that information is a 
Section 16(a) disclosure. 
The three equity-based rules described above stand in sharp 
contrast to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, 
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson.62 Although the Lampf court 
acknowledged that statutes of limitations are “customarily subject to 
tolling,”63—particularly when one party is injured by the fraud of the 
other and remains in ignorance of her injury—the Court found 
sufficient evidence to override this traditional presumption in Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.64 Instead, the Court held 
that the statute of limitations in Section 10(b) is a period of repose—a 
strict outer limit unaffected by the plaintiff’s discovery of information 
pertinent to a potential suit.65 A period of repose is distinguishable 
from a statute of limitations because it is totally inconsistent with 
tolling.66 Although the Lampf Court did not hear arguments 
concerning Section 16,67 both the majority and dissenting opinions 
refer to Section 16(b)’s two-year limitations period, in dicta, as a 
period of repose.68 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments from three partiesthe 
Underwriters, Simmonds, and, writing in support of neither party, the 
United States. The Underwriters claim that Section 16(b) contains a 
period of repose not subject to tolling.69 Simmonds, applying the 
disclosure approach, contends that the statute of limitations in Section 
16(b) should be tolled until the filing of a Section 16(a) report.70 The 
United States, arguing for the application of the discovery approach, 
asserts that Section 16(b)’s statute of limitations should be tolled only 
 
 62.  501 U.S. 350 (1991). 
 63. Id. at 363 (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (citations 
omitted)). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 16–19; see also Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 
920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that tolling is inconsistent with statutes of repose 
because “their very purpose is to set an outer limit unaffected by what the plaintiff knows”). 
 66.  Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363. 
 67.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 
17, at 28 n.7 (“Section 16(b) was not at issue in Lampf . . . .”). 
 68.  Lampf, 501 U.S. at 360 n.5; id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 69.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, passim. 
 70.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, passim. 
RAPPOPORT POST-FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012  3:53 PM 
2012] DISCOVERING CONCEALMENT 179 
until a reasonably diligent investor knows or should know about the 
Section 16(b) violation.71 
A. Underwriters’ Plea for Repose 
The Lampf Court characterized Section 16(b)’s statute of 
limitations, in dicta, as a period of repose.72 In fact, the majority 
opinion noted that the two-year time limit is a “more restrictive” 
period then the three-year period imposed by Section 10(b).73 
Therefore, the Underwriters argue that Lampf provides direct 
support for the proposition that equitable tolling does not apply to 
Section 16(b).74 The Underwriters then turn to the language of Section 
16(b), to similar provisions in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
and to the structure of the 1934 Act to bolster their argument.75 
The Underwriters assert that Section 16(b) contains the language 
of a traditional statute of repose.76 They contend that there is no 
meaningful distinction between the limiting language of Section 
16(b)“[n]o such suit shall be brought more than two years after the 
date” and the outer limits of two companion limitation provisions 
in the Exchange Act that have been characterized by the Lampf 
Court as statutes of repose.77 
Moreover, the Underwriters claim that because Section 16(b) and 
the companion provisions are contemporaneously enacted provisions 
of the same statute, they should be interpreted in a similar fashion.78 
This cohesive reading of the provisions is supported by the policy 
justification underlying each of the sections. The Lampf Court stated 
that both Section 10(b) and the companion provisions were intended 
to “facilitate a central goal: ‘to protect investors against manipulation 
of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities 
 
 71.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17, 
passim. 
 72.  Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363. 
 73.  Id. at 360 n.5. 
 74.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 2 (“Indeed, by reference to these companion 
provisions, this Court already has characterized Section 16(b)’s time limit as a ‘period of repose’ 
that cannot be extended.” (quoting Lampf, 501 U.S. at 360 n.5)). 
 75.  Id. at 16, 18–21. 
 76.  Id. at 16, 20–21. 
 77.  Id. at 20–21. These Sections, 9(e) and 18(c) (hereafter the “companion provisions”), 
read in relevant part: “[N]o action shall be maintained to enforce any liability . . . unless 
brought . . . within three years after such violation.” 
 78.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 20 (quoting Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359). 
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exchanges.’”79 Because Section 16(b) was also implemented to protect 
investors against insiders’ manipulation of stock prices, it should be 
interpreted consistently with the companion provisions.80 Accordingly, 
the Underwriters argue that Section 16(b) should be construed as a 
statute of repose.81 
The Petitioners then juxtapose the single structure of Section 
16(b)’s statute of limitations to the two-part structure of the 
companion provisions’ statutes of limitations.82 Section 9 reads: “An 
action may be brought . . . within one year after the discovery of the 
facts constituting a violation and within three years after such 
violation.”83 This dual-structure “underscores that Congress knew 
perfectly well how to link a time limit to the plaintiff’s ‘discovery’ [of 
pertinent facts].”84 Nonetheless, Congress avoided adopting discovery-
specific language for Section 16(b) and, instead, tied the running of 
the statute of limitations to the date on which short-swing profits 
were realized.85 
The lack of a general discovery rule in Section 16(b) highlights 
another issue with Simmonds’ petition for equitable relief: although 
discovery rules traditionally lengthen the period in which a plaintiff 
can bring suit, the limited discovery rules in the companion provisions 
shorten the limitations period from three years to one year.86 This 
suggests that Congress intended discovery rules to act as restrictions 
on statutory time limits in the Securities Exchange Act. The 
Underwriters argue, therefore, that where Congress implements an 
explicit discovery rule to shorten a statute of limitations, a court 
should not read an implicit discovery rule into a neighboring section 
of the same statute in order to extend a limitations period.87 
 
 79.  Lampf, 501 U.S. at 360–61 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 
(1976)). 
 80.  See Interpretive Release on Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting and Trading, 
Release No. 34-18114, 46 Fed. Reg. 48147-01, at 48147 (Oct. 1, 1981) (finding that Congress 
enacted Section 16 to prevent insiders from manipulating the price of company stock). 
 81.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, passim. 
 82.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 19–21 (“The juxtaposition of a ‘discovery’ 
time limit with an outer time limit in Sections 9(e) and 18(c) also shows that the outer time limit 
of these dual-structure provisions is a period of repose that cannot be extended, regardless of 
when the plaintiff discovers a claim.”). 
 83.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C.A § 78i(f) (West 2010). 
 84.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 19. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 21. 
 87.  Id. at 22. 
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The Underwriters also note that the companion provisions involve 
intentional violations of securities law. Section 16(b), however, is a 
strict liability provision carrying no scienter requirement.88 In fact, 
Section 16(b) does not prohibit insiders from engaging in short-swing 
transactions; it merely forces disgorgement of profits in covered 
transactions.89 The Underwriters maintain that it would seem 
counterintuitive to assume that Congress intended to allow repose in 
cases of intentional fraud (as the Court had done in Lampf), yet deny 
repose to insiders who were unknowingly violating the technical 
requirements of Section 16(b).90 
B. Absolute Disclosure: Simmonds’ Argument for Equitable Tolling 
Simmonds argues that the Underwriters’ failure to disclose 
transactions covered under Section 16(a) is a breach of an affirmative 
duty of disclosure that tolls the statute of limitations.91 Moreover, 
relying on both Whittaker and Litzler, Simmonds contends that the 
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the filing of a Section 
16(a) disclosure because Congress’s purpose of “curb[ing] insider 
trading” requires the imposition of an “absolute duty” of disclosure.92 
1. Rebutting the Underwriters’ Arguments for Repose 
First, Simmonds attempts to show that the text of Section 16(b) 
more closely resembles a traditional statute of limitations rather than 
a period of repose.93 Periods of repose often focus on the elimination 
of the underlying right rather than the suit’s timeliness.94 Section 




 88.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 22–23. 
 89.  Id. at 23; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(b) (West 
2010). 
 90.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 23. 
 91.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 24–26 (implying that the absolute duty to 
disclose gives rise to tolling). 
 92.  Id. at 23–26. 
 93.  Id. at 18. 
 94.  Id. For example, the statute of limitations in § 1635(f) of the Truth in Lending Act 
reads in relevant part that the “right of rescission shall expire three years after the date . . . .” 
 95.  Id.; see also Donald C. Cook & Myer Feldman, Insider Trading under the Securities 
Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385, 413 (1953) (“The two-year statute of limitations in 
Section 16(b) is not a condition of the right to action. It is merely a limitation upon bringing . . . 
suits . . . .”). 
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Next, Simmonds argues that the Underwriters’ reliance on Lampf 
is misplaced.96 The Lampf Court did not emphasize the precise 
wording of the relevant provisions in deciding whether Section 10(b)’s 
time limitation was a statute of repose. Instead, when rebutting the 
standard presumption against equitable tolling, the Lampf majority 
gave particular consideration to the structure of the companion 
provisions: “[T]he equitable tolling doctrine is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the 1-and-3-year structure.”97 According to the 
Court, the inner one-year limit already provides for the discovery of 
facts by the plaintiff, thereby making discovery-based tolling 
superfluous.98 As a result, the three-year term serves as a strict outer 
limitas a period of repose not subject to tollingonly because of its 
relationship to the one-year inner limit.99 The companion provisions 
already provide for the application of a discovery rule, the three-year 
time limit does not need to be extended in order to afford additional 
time for discovery.100 Section 16(b) lacks this dual structure.101 
Therefore, the key to the majority’s reasoning in Lampf for overriding 
the traditional presumption for equitable tolling is not present in this 
case.102 
More importantly, Section 16(b) was never at issue in Lampf; the 
characterization of Section 16(b) as a period of repose is merely dicta. 
In fact, Lampf explicitly rejected any analogy between Section 10(b) 
and Section 16(b), refusing to adopt Section 16(b)’s time limitation 
because of its differing focus and alternative means of punishment.103 
Therefore, the Court has implicitly acknowledged that Section 16(b) 
should be evaluated on its own terms. 
Finally, Simmonds claims that the legislative history of Section 16 
supports a narrow interpretation of the provision. Congress 
 
 96.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 28. 
 97.  Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17, 
at 26–27. 
 101.  Id. at 27; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(b) (West 
2010). 
 102.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 
17, at 27 (arguing that the Lampf Court “did not suggest that the presumption for equitable 
tolling is generally inapplicable to limitations periods contained in the securities law”). 
 103.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 28; see also Lampf, 501 U.S. at 360 n.5 
(“Because that provision [Section 16(b)] requires the disgorgement of unlawful profits and 
differs in focus from § 10(b) and from the other express causes of action, we do not find § 16(b) 
to be an appropriate source from which to borrow a limitations period here.”). 
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specifically rejected a repose approach when drafting Section 16.104 In 
the first draft of the House bill, Congress considered a dual-structure 
approach similar to that of the companion provisions, drafting the 
following language: “No such suit shall be brought more than six 
months after such profit was realized if the facts upon which such suit 
was based were disclosed . . . or more than three years after such 
profit was realized if the facts were not disclosed.”105 This language 
was subsequently deleted.106 “[F]ew principles of statutory 
construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress 
does not intend sub silento to enact statutory language that it has 
earlier discarded.”107 In fact, rather than foreclosing the application of 
equitable remedies to Section 16(b), Congress specifically reinforced 
the presumption of equitable tolling by explicitly providing for the 
operation of equitable remedies: suit to recover short-swing profits 
“may be instituted at law or in equity.”108 
2. A Conjunctive Reading of Section 16 
Simmonds further argues that Section 16(b) should be interpreted 
in conjunction with Section 16(a).109 Such an interpretation would 
provide the necessary link between the cause of action provided by 
Section 16(b) and the disclosure of the covered transaction under 
Section 16(a). Because the cause of action depends on the disclosure, 
the running of the statute of limitations should also depend on the 
disclosure of the covered transaction.110 
To prove this connection, Simmonds asserts that Congress 
“grammatically” linked Section 16(b)’s time limit to its counterpart 
provision, Section 16(a):111 “[N]o such suit [under Section 16(b)] shall 
 
 104.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 29–30. 
 105.  Id. at 29 (quoting H.R. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 73RD 
CONG., SECURITIES EXCHANGE BILL 45 (Subcomm. Print Apr. 18, 1934)). 
 106.  See H.R. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 73RD CONG., SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE BILL 45 (Subcomm. Print Apr. 26, 1934). 
 107.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 30–31 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421, 442–43 (1987)). 
 108.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(b) (West 2010) (emphasis 
added). 
 109.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 5 (“[Section 16(a) reports] ‘are an integral 
part of the context of § 16 within which § 16(b) must be read.’” (quoting Whittaker v. Whittaker 
Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 528 (9th Cir. 1981))). 
 110.  See id. at 22 (“Underwriters’ no-tolling construction ignores [Section 16(a)’s disclosure 
requirement].”). 
 111.  Id. at 20 (quoting ARNOLD JACOBS, SECTION 16 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 
§ 1:1 (2012)). 
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be brought more than two years after the date such profit was 
realized.”112 “Such profit” refers to profits realized by the “beneficial 
owner, director, officer” defined in Section 16(a)(1).113 Under Section 
16(a)(3), such statutory insiders must disclose their purchase or sale 
of “equity securities of such issuer of which the filing person is the 
beneficial owner.”114 Therefore, the operation of Section 16(b)’s 
statute of limitations presumes that Section 16(a) profits will be 
disclosed.115 
Furthermore, Simmonds argues that the underlying rationale for 
Section 16 would be thwarted if insiders could escape liability under 
Section 16(b) by not properly reporting transactions under Section 
16(a).116 Section 16(b) works only by imposing an “absolute duty” of 
disclosure upon insiders subject to Section 16(a).117 A failure to 
disclose a transaction under Section 16(a) would, therefore, effectively 
insulate insiders from Section 16(b) liability. 
Simmonds supports this absolute duty requirement by turning to 
the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. When 
drafting Section 16(b), Congress was concerned with correcting the 
asymmetry of information between insiders and other shareholders.118 
The legislative history details several incidents where insiders with 
advanced knowledge of material information bought and sold 
securities of the issuerof which they were a beneficial ownerfor 
purposes of personal gain.119 Some insiders went so far as to 
manipulate the market price of their own company’s securities in 
order to obtain short-swing profits.120 Section 16, however, was not 
meant to punish insider short-swing transactions.121 Instead, Congress 
created a prophylactic incentive structure intended to prevent future 
 
 112.  § 16(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b) (West 2010)) (emphasis added). 
 113.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 21. 
 114.  § 16(a)(3)(A) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a)(3)(A) (West 2010)). 
 115.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 21. 
 116.  Id. at 45–46; Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 528 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 117.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 26; Litzler v. CC Invs., L.D.C., 362 F.3d 
203, 208 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 118.  See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 243 (1976) 
(“Congress recognized that insiders may have access to information about their corporations 
not available to the rest of the investing public.”). 
 119.  Interpretive Release on Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting and Trading, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 48147-01, at 48147 (Oct. 1, 1981) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 241). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680, 689 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[Section 16(b)] is 
meant to prevent, rather than to cure what has already happened.”). 
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opportunistic behavior.122 The two subsections of Section 16 depend 
on one another to properly implement this incentive scheme.123 
Section 16(a) requires directors, officers, and stockholders who 
own more than ten percent of a company’s stock to disclose the 
amount of equity security that they currently hold, as well as any 
change in ownership of company stock within two business days of 
their purchase or sale of such stock.124 Such persons lose some of their 
time-sensitive informational advantage by revealing to the market, 
within a period of two days, their reassessment of the value of their 
own company.125 Consequently, Section 16(a) acts as a deterrent to 
insiders’ potential abuses by allowing market mechanisms to limit the 
effect of insiders’ opportunistic behavior. 
Employing similar deterrent effects, Section 16(b) allows 
shareholders to force disgorgement of any beneficiary’s profits made 
from the purchase or sale of the beneficiary company’s security within 
a period of six months.126 This is a strict liability provision.127 The 
disgorgement remedy of Section 16(b) is prophylactic: it does not 
punish past insider short-swing transactions. Instead, it is intended to 
prevent future manipulative trading by taking away any incentive to 
manipulate share prices.128 A prophylactic scheme, by definition, can 
only work effectively if insiders are properly disincentivized from 
violating the relevant provision: “[I]f s 16(b) is to have the ‘optimum 
prophylactic effect’ which its architects intended, insiders must not be 
permitted so easily to circumvent its broad mandate.”129 
 
 
 122.  Id.; Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 51617 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding that Section 16(b) acts 
as a deterrent). 
 123.  See Litzler v. CC Invs., L.D.C., 362 F.3d 203, 208 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The prophylaxis of 
Section 16 works by imposing an ‘absolute duty’ of disclosure upon insiders . . . .” (quoting 
Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1947))). 
 124.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(a) (West 2010). 
 125.  See Morales v. Quintel Entertainment, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding 
that the purpose of Section 16 is to deter insiders from taking advantage of confidential 
information). 
 126.  § 16(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b) (West 2010)). 
 127.  See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972) (“The objective 
standard of Section 16(b) imposes strict liability upon substantially all transactions occurring 
within the statutory time period, regardless of the intent of the insider or the existence of actual 
speculation.”). 
 128.  See Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680, 689 (2d Cir. 1975) (“In so interpreting 
‘beneficial owner’ we are not ‘adding’ to the prophylactic effect Congress itself clearly 
prescribed in [§] 16(b).”). 
 129.  Reliance Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 432 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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This prophylactic scheme, claims Simmonds, must ensure that 
insiders are not afforded easy opportunities to evade the law.130 It 
must therefore provide sufficient deterrents against the violation of 
the relevant provision. Section 16(b) provides this deterrent through a 
nearly automatic application and “disclosure . . . that is so clear that an 
insider’s short-swing profits will be discovered without any 
investigation other than the putting together of two and two.”131 It 
requires a bright-line determination of insider short-swing trading, 
based on strict liability, that is both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive.132 Given the difficulties involved in uncovering evidence of 
insider trading, Section 16(b) can only ensure the adequate protection 
of shareholdersand by negative implication, adequate deterrence of 
insidersby providing for an “absolute duty” to file Section 16(a) 
reports. To do so would tie the running of the statute of limitations to 
the disclosure of the covered transaction.133 Unless an “absolute duty” 
is imposed, Simmonds asserts that insiders will be able to circumvent 
the application of Section 16(b) by failing to disclose their short-swing 
transactions and then watching the statute of limitations run.134 
Congress’s intention to impose an “absolute duty” of disclosure 
explains why it implemented an exclusively private enforcement 
 
 130.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 26. 
 131.  Litzler v. CC Invs., L.D.C., 362 F.3d 203, 208 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Blau v. Lamb, 363 
F.2d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 1966) (“[Section 16(b)’s] success as a deterrent was rooted in its simplicity 
and relatively automatic operation . . . .”). 
 132.  See Dreiling v. Am. Exp. Co., 458 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The statute imposes 
strict liability on insiders only for ‘shortswing’ trades . . . . Courts have recognized that § 16(b) is 
a blunt instrument, at once both over- and under-inclusive.”). 
 133.  See Litzler, 363 F.3d at 208 (“The prophylaxis of Section 16 . . . would be impaired if 
the tolling triggered by non-compliance was ended or defeated by mere inquiry notice, or by 
circumstances in which a person would or should have realized the non-compliance, or by the 
ability of a shareholder or company to piece together the substance of a Form 4 from disparate 
sources of information.”); see also Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) 
(“The short space of time within which the action must be brought under Section 16(b) is 
intelligible only when read in the context of an absolute duty to make prompt and frequent 
reports.”). 
 134.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 24–26; see also Whittaker v. Whittaker 
Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 528 (9th Cir. 1981); Blau v. Albert, 157 F. Supp. 816, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) 
(“[I]t would be a simple matter for the unscrupulous to avoid the salutary effect of Section 16(b) 
which provides a remedy for the recovery of short term profits, simply by failing to file monthly 
reports in violation of subdivision (a) and thereby concealing from prospective plaintiffs the 
information which they would need to adequately protect their interests.”); Marc I. Steinberg & 
Daryl L. Landsdale, Jr., The Judicial and Regulatory Constriction of Section 16(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33, 59 (1992) (“To permit an insider 
to violate section 16(a) by neglecting its filing obligation and thereby avoid section 16(b) 
liability . . . conflicts with the congressional objective of deterring insider abuse . . . .”). 
RAPPOPORT POST-FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012  3:53 PM 
2012] DISCOVERING CONCEALMENT 187 
mechanism for Section 16(b)135 while expressly creating a public 
enforcement mechanism for Section 16(a).136 Under the intended 
incentive scheme of an “absolute duty” to disclose, the government 
guarantees the disclosure of all necessary information under Section 
16(a),137 leaving shareholders holding the reins only with regard to the 
enforcement mechanism of Section 16(b). Because all shareholders 
are presumed to have access to information regarding insider’s short-
swing profits,138 the enforcement mechanism becomes so easy for a 
private individual to administer that there is no need for the 
unnecessary expenditure of public resources. Only if shareholders are 
entitled to rely on an expectation that all inside transactions are 
public information will the court effectuate Congress’s intent and give 
investors confidence that they have sufficient protection under the 
current legal regime. Adequate protection can only be achieved by 
enforcing the principle of absolute disclosure. 
C. Limiting Principles: Arguments for the Application of a Discovery 
Rule 
Arguing for neither side, the United States Government occupies 
a middle ground between the positions of Simmonds and the 
Underwriters. Analogizing to arguments advanced by the Supreme 
Court in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds,139 the United States maintains that 
equity does not necessarily require tolling of the limitations period 
until after the filing of a Section 16(a) report.140 Although such a filing 
would start the running of the statute of limitations, it is not the only 
triggering scenario.141 Rather, the equitable tolling exemption should 
apply in cases of fraud or concealment until the “litigant first knows 
or with due diligence should know facts that will form the basis for an 
action.”142 Section 16(b)’s statute of limitations, therefore, begins to 
run whenever a reasonable plaintiff should discover the facts 
necessary to bring a short-swing claim.143 
 
 135.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(b) (West 2010). 
 136.  Id. at § 16(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a) (West 2010)). 
 137.  See Cook & Feldman, supra note 95, at 414 (arguing that if there is no disclosure under 
Section 16(a), shareholders are not charged with adequate notice of the transaction). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010). 
 140.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17, 
at 19–24. 
 141.  Id. at 20–21. 
 142.  Id. at 19 (quoting Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1794). 
 143.  Id. 
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Equitable tolling is an exception to the general limitations rule, 
applying whenever a defendant’s fraudulent conduct prevents a 
plaintiff from “even knowing that he or she had been defrauded.”144 
Only where the plaintiffwithout any want of diligence on his 
partremains in ignorance of the fraud committed upon him, does 
the statute of limitations continue to be tolled. If, on the other hand, 
the plaintiff knows of the defendant’s activities and sleeps on his 
rights, he should not be permitted to bring suit.145 The United States 
argues that the appellate court’s application of the Whittaker standard 
(that tolling does not begin to run until the filing of a Section 16(a) 
disclosure) is therefore inconsistent with the correct background 
rule.146 Instead, the appellate court should have determined whether 
Simmonds actually discovered, or whether a reasonable security 
holder should have discovered, the facts underlying the short-swing 
claim.147 
V. ANALYSIS 
Application of equitable tolling rules in this case will require the 
Supreme Court to carefully balance the rights and responsibilities of 
shareholders and insiders. The Underwriters’ argument presents 
significant problems in this regard. A repose approach would 
interpret Section 16(b) narrowly, conforming to judicial precedent 
favoring literal interpretations of strict liability provisions.148 
Congress’s imposition of strict liability, however, was intended to 
“squeeze all possible profits out of a stock transactions [sic], and thus 
to establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between the 
selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director, or stockholder and the 
faithful performance of his duty.”149 Allowing the two-year limitations 
period to run when a shareholder does not or should not know of the 
 
 144.  Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1793. 
 145.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17, 
at 21–22. 
 146.  Id. at 21. 
 147.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17, 
at 21; see also Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1798 (holding that the limitations period begins to run when 
the plaintiff discovers, or when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered, the facts 
constituting the violation). 
 148.  See, e.g., Gollust v. Mendel, 501 U.S. 115, 122 (1991). Because Section 16(b) imposes 
strict liability without fault, courts are reluctant to extend the scope of Section 16(b) liability, 
even in situations that would fall within the evils that Congress attempted to curb. 
 149.  See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943) (assuming this to be 
Congress’s intention). 
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covered transaction would defeat Section 16(b)’s core prophylactic 
purpose by allowing the statute of limitations to run in cases of 
blatant fraud.150 Moreover, a repose approach would task shareholders 
with actively investigating all corporate insiders, or risk losing their 
right to bring suit in federal court. 
A disclosure or actual notice rule lacks the flaws of the repose 
approach and reaffirms the bond between the two subsections of 
Section 16.151 A disclosure or actual notice rule would effectuate the 
prophylactic nature of the statute and ensure that covered insider 
short-swing transactions “will be discovered without any investigation 
other than the putting together of two and two.”152 Disclosure or 
actual notice would create a strict, mechanical, and bright-line statute 
of limitations that would not begin to run until the filing of a Section 
16(a) disclosure. 
Such an approach, however, greatly skews the proper balance of 
responsibilities between insiders and shareholdersbetween 
disclosure and investigationshifting too much responsibility onto 
the former. When debating statutes of limitations in the Securities 
Exchange Act, Congress worried that “lingering liabilities would 
disrupt normal business and facilitate false claims.”153 Statutes of 
limitation are intended to limit the period of liability for old 
transactions, preventing a Sword of Damocles from indefinitely 
hanging over a potential wrongdoer’s head.154 Both disclosure and 
actual notice approaches create exactly this kind of indefinite 
liability.155 If insiders can be held liable decades after the completion 
of the covered transaction, there is a risk of significant chilling effects 
that would deter individuals from serving on boards of directors.156 In 
order to ameliorate the effects of this harsh rule, policy considerations 
dictate that shareholders, though not required to thoroughly 
 
 150.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17, 
at 30. 
 151.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 46 (arguing that Section 16(b) requires 
enforcement requires Section 16(a) disclosure). 
 152.  Litzler v. CC Invs., L.D.C., 362 F.3d 203, 208 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 153.  Ferguson v. Roberts, 11 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  See In re Section 16(b) Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (finding 
that Simmonds’ theory of liability provided no demarcated boundaries, nor did it provide any 
end date of liability). 
 156.  See Brief of Chamber of Com. of the U.S. and Sec. Industr. and Fin. Markets Ass’n as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1112, Credit Suisse Sec. v. Simmonds, No. 10-1261 
(U.S. Aug. 25, 2011) (noting that Senator Kean describes indefinite liability as “blackmail”). 
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investigate possible infringements of Section 16(b), should at least be 
expected to avail themselves of public information. 
Where all relevant information about covered transactions has 
become public, there are no practical justifications for allowing the 
continued tolling of a statute of limitations. Accordingly, adopting a 
discovery rule instead of a disclosure rule will not place an onerous 
burden on investors. Under the discovery approach, failure to disclose 
a Section 16 transaction will toll the statute of limitation: the 
purposeful concealment of the covered transaction, preventing a 
shareholder from discovering the short-swing profit, clearly falls 
within the ambit of Holmberg v. Ambrecht’s discovery rule.157 In the 
present case, however, where shareholders had access to all facts 
necessary to constitute a Section 16(b) violation at least five years 
before the filing their claim, insiders should be entitled to expect a 
certain level of repose.158 
This case highlights that a bright-line disclosure rule is too blunt 
an instrument for determining when a statute of limitations should 
begin to run. Rather, courts should determine whether a reasonable 
shareholder, through reasonable diligence, could have discovered the 
information needed to bring suit.159 This discovery rule will best 
balance the interests of all parties involved; the markets will have 
confidence that there is sufficient disclosure of insider trading, 
insiders will not fear unlimited liability, and plaintiffs will have 
sufficient time to uncover the facts necessary to bring their claims to 
court. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the facts of this case illustrate that investors will still be 
able to rely on the sufficiency of an insider’s disclosures without a 
judicially imposed “absolute duty” to disclose. Therefore, the Court 
should adopt the discovery rule, reversing the Ninth Circuit and 
barring all twenty-four complaints on the ground that they were 
brought more than two years after the date that a reasonably diligent 
 
 157.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17, 
at 7–8; see also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (holding that equity tolls a 
statute when a defendant has concealed facts essential to the plaintiff’s claim). 
 158.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, note 17, at 
7–8 (arguing that the statute of limitations should begin to run when information has come to 
light in ways other than through a section 16(a) disclosure). 
 159.  Id. 
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shareholder discovered or should have discovered the facts that 
would form the basis of a Section 16(b) short-swing claim. 
 
